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BABES AND BEEFCAKE: EXCLUSIVE HIRING ARRANGEMENTS 
AND SEXY DRESS CODES 
ANN C. MCGINLEY* 
I. INTRODUCTION: EXCLUSIVE HIRING, BFOQS, AND SEX-SPECIFIC DRESS CODES 
Las Vegas casinos exclusively hire women to serve cocktails on the casino 
floor, dressing them in tight-fitting, sexy, uncomfortable costumes and high 
heels. The exclusive hiring of women as cocktail servers violates Title VII’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination unless the employer can demonstrate that 
being a woman is a bona fide occupational qualification1 (“BFOQ”) for the job of 
cocktail server.2 
The courts interpret the BFOQ defense very narrowly.3 In Int’l Union v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., the Supreme Court held that an employer will prevail 
using the BFOQ defense only if sex or the sex-differentiated job qualification 
relates to the “essence” or the “central mission” of the employer’s business and 
is objectively and verifiably necessary to the employee’s performance of job 
tasks and responsibilities. 4 
While courts, scholars, and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) consistently interpret Title VII to forbid employers from 
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 1. The statute provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice for “an employer to hire 
and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain 
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) 
(2000). 
 2. It is possible that a casino employer would argue that only women applied for the job and 
therefore the casino is not discriminating against men because of sex when they hire women cocktail 
servers. Nonetheless, if a casino made this argument in response to a lawsuit, plaintiff might be able 
to point to the “inexorable zero”—the number of men working in the position of cocktail server. See 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342, n.23 (1977) (noting that the company could 
not rebut the inference of race discrimination because of the “inexorable zero”— the total absence of 
minorities in line driver jobs). Depending on the facts and the court’s orientation, a plausible pattern 
and practice case might exist against a casino. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a). 
 3. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). 
 4. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201. 
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using customer preference as a defense to illegal discrimination,5 they recognize 
the defense to protect consumer preferences in three situations. First, some 
courts permit defendants to use the BFOQ defense in health care or prison 
situations where the patient or inmate’s fundamental right to personal privacy 
or safety is at stake.6 Second, while courts do not recognize a BFOQ defense for 
employers hiring women for sex appeal,7 Dean Katharine Bartlett concludes that 
sex should be a BFOQ if the central mission of the employer’s business is to sell 
sex or sexual entertainment.8 Finally, the EEOC concludes that sex may be a 
BFOQ to guarantee authenticity in a dramatic production.9 
 
 5. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
stereotyped customer preferences do not justify sexually discriminatory practices); Diaz v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the airline violated Title VII by 
refusing to hire male flight attendants even though customers preferred women for the job); Olsen v. 
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that the employer could not 
refuse to hire male massage therapists even though women customers preferred women). 
 6. See Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 761 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding the prison’s 
BFOQ defense for hiring females only for certain positions in female prisons based on a documented 
history of sexual abuse and assaults of the female prisoners by male prison guards); Healey v. 
Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding BFOQ defense of children’s 
psychiatric hospital which transferred the female plaintiff, a child care specialist, to the night shift in 
order to assure there was at least one woman on every shift because child patients were victims of 
sex abuse ); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp 376, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(concluding that there is a BFOQ that at least one person working in a mental health facility as a 
Security Hospital Treatment Assistant be a woman to protect the privacy and security of women 
patients). 
 7. See, e.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385 (holding that defendant could not limit its flight attendant 
positions to women because customers preferred women’s sex appeal); Wilson v. Sw Airlines, Inc., 
517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that sex appeal of women flight attendants was not a 
BFOQ for the job). 
 8. Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community 
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2577 (1994). 
 9. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (2003) states: 
(a) The commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to 
sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels—”Men’s jobs” and “Women’s jobs”—
tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other. 
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the 
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: 
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of 
the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For 
example, the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher 
than among men. 
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterization of 
the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable 
of assembling intricate equipment: that women are less capable of 
aggressive salesmanship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that 
individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on 
the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group. 
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, 
the employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section. 
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the 
Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., 
an actor or actress. 
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These exceptions are narrow and may or may not reasonably exclude 
casino operators from claiming a BFOQ defense for hiring women exclusively as 
cocktail waitresses. Although casinos may have difficulty proving that the 
essence of their business is to sell sex, the EEOC’s recognition of authenticity 
may support a casino’s BFOQ defense. Casinos will argue that the essence of 
their business is entertainment and that young female cocktail servers dressed in 
sexy garb represent the epitome of what a Las Vegas casino is: a glamorous 
illusion. The casino’s brand identity, the argument goes, is closely related to the 
appearance and dress of the cocktail servers, and hiring attractive women and 
dressing them in sexy uniforms is related to the essence of the entertainment 
business. 
Strict appearance and dress codes governing cocktail servers’ uniforms are 
closely related to, but not determinative of, the question of whether Title VII 
permits casinos to hire women exclusively to serve cocktails on the casino floors. 
Without the appearance codes and uniforms required of cocktail servers, the 
casinos’ argument that cocktail servers must be women would necessarily fail. It 
is not merely women, but women with a particular appearance, that casinos hire 
as cocktail servers. In most casinos, cocktail servers are young, shapely, smiling, 
and thin. The form-fitting uniforms enhance their sexuality and the illusion that 
the cocktail server exists merely to please the male casino customer. 
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,10 an appearance code case that may have 
significant repercussions in Nevada casinos and other similar establishments. In 
Jespersen, Harrah’s Casino in Reno, Nevada fired the plaintiff, a female 
bartender, for refusing to wear makeup. The Ninth Circuit concluded that sex-
differentiated appearance and grooming codes are legal in jobs held by both 
men and women unless they impose unequal burdens on men and women.11 
The Ninth Circuit, however, added an interesting twist. It concluded that a 
plaintiff may attack a dress and grooming code under Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins12 if the code intentionally stereotypes women because of their sex and 
the stereotyping objectively interferes with the woman’s ability to perform the 
job.13 
Undoubtedly, the uniforms worn by women cocktail servers intentionally 
stereotype them because of their sex. After Jespersen, a casino would have to 
prove, in response to a lawsuit challenging its dress code, that it is a BFOQ for a 
woman cocktail server to dress in a sexy uniform. Assuming that the courts 
would conclude that being a woman who dresses in sexy garb is not a BFOQ for 
the position of cocktail server, Jespersen raises the question of whether the 
 
 10. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 11. Id. at 1109–10. 
 12. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins challenged her 
employer’s failure to make her a partner in the large accounting firm. The Supreme Court concluded 
that discrimination based on Hopkins’ failure to conform to stereotyped expectations of the proper 
dress and behavior for women was discrimination because of sex. Id. at 255–56. 
 13. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111–12 (en banc). 
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casinos may legally hire both men and women, and dress both in sexy costumes, 
which in essence, sexually stereotypes both men and women.14 
This article examines the strengths and weaknesses of potential legal and 
policy arguments concerning whether being a woman dressed in a sexy uniform 
is a BFOQ for the job of casino cocktail server. Concluding that being a woman 
should not be a BFOQ for the job, this article addresses whether casino owners 
may require that women and men cocktail servers wear sexy provocative 
uniforms to serve cocktails in Las Vegas casinos. 
Part II briefly describes a “typical” cocktail waitress in Las Vegas. Part III 
analyzes courts’ and scholars’ interpretations of the proper scope of the BFOQ 
defense. Part IV explores both current interpretations and policy considerations 
concerning application of the BFOQ defense to Nevada casinos that argue that 
being a sexy, young woman is a BFOQ for the job of cocktail server. Part V 
addresses whether Jespersen permits casino owners to dress both women and 
men cocktail servers in sexually provocative clothing. It asks whether the 
unequal burdens test would apply to men and women whose jobs require them 
to wear sexually stereotyping clothing and, if so, how the courts should decide 
whether particular sexy clothing places an unequal burden on men or women. 
Finally, this article concludes that being a woman should not be a BFOQ for 
the job of cocktail server, but that Jespersen should permit casinos hiring cocktail 
servers and other similar employers whose jobs include an aspect of 
performance to require that both men and women wear sexually provocative 
uniforms to work. This conclusion should apply, however, only in those jobs 
where the employer legitimately sells entertainment and the job itself involves 
performance. For industries other than those promoting entertainment and jobs 
that do not involve performance, requiring men and women to perform their sex 
at work may cause harm to their sense of identity and intrude upon their 
privacy interests.15 
II. A COCKTAIL SERVER’S JOB16 
The scantily clad young woman maneuvers through the crowded smoky room, 
carrying a tray full of drinks. She wears high heels, long black stockings, a tight-fitting 
bustier, and short-shorts, a costume that displays her long legs and ample breasts. Her 
 
 14. A threshold question exists: whether Jespersen rightfully decided that the burdens test 
applies to jobs held by both men and women and if so, how to apply that test. For an interesting 
argument that sex-differentiated grooming codes violate Title VII, see David B. Cruz, Making Up 
Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 244–45 (2004), arguing that the BFOQ defense 
applies only to hiring and firing and not to conditions of employment. 
 15. For an interesting discussion concerning the privacy interests of employees in the dress and 
grooming at work, see generally Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-
Examining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006). See also Carrie 
Yang Costello, Changing Clothes: Gender Inequality and Professional Socialization, 16 NWSA J. 138 (June 
2004) (concluding that attempting to comport with professional dress requirements can lead to 
“identity dissonance”—”the disconcerting internal experience of conflict between irreconcilable 
aspects of their self-concepts”). 
 16. The following description is of a fictitious cocktail server. However, the conditions and 
attitudes described are real composites of information I have learned from observation and 
interviews with cocktail servers and other casino or former casino employees. 
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hair is fixed and her nails are painted a light pink. She wears carefully-applied 
foundation, eye liner and shadow, lipstick, and blush. Although her arms are bare and 
the room is very cold, she does not wear a sweater. She always wears a smile as she walks 
from table to table serving the patrons in the Las Vegas casino. While some would 
consider her look an anachronism, others believe that she looks glamorous, sexy, and 
willing to serve; she exudes the aura of a person who has no problems of her own. She is 
part of the illusion that Las Vegas sells to its customers. There are no problems in Las 
Vegas: Everyone is here to serve the customer. 
Before we see her on the casino floor, the cocktail server, who is a single mother, 
picked up her two children from school, quickly cooked them dinner and got them started 
on their homework. She spent an hour putting on makeup and fixing her hair before 
leaving for the casino. Once at the casino, she picked up her uniform from the casino dry 
cleaners and dashed to the locker room to dress for the evening. In the locker room, she 
dressed in her required clothing, even down to the regulation push-up bra. Last year she 
underwent breast augmentation surgery. Her employer offered to pay for it, and she 
finds that her tips are better now that her cleavage is deeper and her breasts firmer. She 
hastened to attend a required fifteen minute roll-call meeting at the casino when her 
supervisor inspected her uniform to ensure that her appearance followed the strict 
regulations of the casino. Had she not worn her hair properly, or had she worn flat shoes, 
her supervisor may have docked her points or sent her home. Had she worn a sweater, 
her supervisor would have reminded her to remove it before she went onto the casino 
floor, despite the frigid temperatures. 
Now the cocktail server is on the floor serving customers. She makes a considerable 
income, the vast majority from tips, and is relatively happy with her lot. She works at 
one of the “high-end” casinos that attract a wealthier clientele and she feels somewhat 
superior to the “girls” who work at the “low-end” casinos. She has heard rumors that at 
some of those casinos the management requires cocktail servers to sign agreements that 
they will be weighed monthly. If they gain more than six pounds, they will be laid off 
until they lose the weight. At least she does not have to put up with that treatment! 
At 32 years old, she knows that this job will not last forever; if she keeps in shape, 
she may be able to last until she hits 38 or 40. She knows a number of women who are 
serving cocktails at other casinos who are well into their 40’s. But she is not sure how 
much longer she has at the job because the casinos are increasingly hiring younger 
women to serve cocktails. She also knows that a neighboring high-end casino replaced its 
older cocktail waitresses a few years ago with “bevertainers”. The concept was that the 
women would dance as they served cocktails. The casino eliminated some cocktail server 
jobs and held auditions for the new servers. Those who auditioned for the job were 
younger and many had aspirations to model or act. Some believed that the casino 
introduced the bevertainer concept not only to rid itself of the older women who served 
cocktails, but also to change the cocktail server position from union to non-union. 
She isn’t sure how she feels about union representation because she works in a non-
union shop. Most of the cocktail servers in town are represented by the Culinary 
Workers Union, but there are a few casinos that do not have union representation.17 
 
 17. While the influence of labor unions is declining nationally, membership in labor unions is 
increasing in Nevada. The Culinary Workers Union, which represents service employees working in 
many of the Nevada casinos, experienced a 20% increase in membership in 2005, while overall union 
09__MCGINLEY.DOC 2/8/2007 2:05 PM 
262 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:257 2007 
Although she does not see much of a difference in working conditions for cocktail servers 
where the unions exist, she believes that the union might be more protective of job 
security and longevity. 
She knows that there are no men serving cocktails on the floors of any of the 
casinos. Her view is that no man would want the job. When asked whether men should 
be hired for the job, she thinks it would be impossible—what would they wear? This is a 
woman’s job, and, anyway, she makes more in tips than the bartenders and bar backs 
who stock the bars, who are mostly men. It is true that the casino is loud and smoky, and 
that her feet ache at the end of the day. The clients are often fresh and occasionally harass 
her, but in most casinos there is good security. If a client really acts up she knows she 
can have him bounced, unless perhaps he is a high roller. High rollers get special 
treatment and it is more difficult to have them evicted.18 She knows of a number of 
women who developed hip problems from carrying the heavy trays on one side. Even she, 
who is relatively healthy, has her spine adjusted regularly by a chiropractor. 
One thing does bother her a little. Each casino has employees who act as hosts to 
the high rollers. The hosts arrange dinner and show reservations for guests, and 
generally serve as resources to the high-betting patrons. Because the vast majority of 
high rollers are men, the casinos exclusively hire men to fill the role of casino host. She 
might be interested in acting as a casino host because they make more money than she 
does. Moreover, in some of the high roller rooms, casino hosts, rather than cocktail 
waitresses, serve drinks to the high roller customers. The hosts may be cutting into her 
tips, but she has no way to become a host. She understands that being a host is a man’s 
job, particularly because the hosts go with the high rollers to the strip clubs. 
* * * * * * 
Nevada casinos openly and self-consciously sell sexual appeal by limiting 
cocktail serving jobs to women dressed in alluring outfits. While they do not 
advertise the jobs as exclusively for women, they hire women exclusively as 
cocktail servers and men exclusively as casino hosts.19 The market is well-
established, and locals accept these hiring practices as the natural order of 
things. Like our fictitious cocktail server, locals cannot imagine a man serving 
cocktails. What would he possibly wear? What man would want that job? 
Remarkably, while cocktail servers have challenged the high heel requirement 
and the differential treatment of pregnant women who serve cocktails, it 
appears that no man has ever challenged the casinos for failing to hire him as a 
cocktail server. In fact, men do not apply for these jobs.20 However, men do serve 
 
membership grew from 12.5% to 13.8% of the working population between 2004 and July 2006. See J. 
Patrick Coolican, Reid Puts Nevada In ‘08 Spotlight, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 23, 2006, at 1. 
 18. See Ann C. McGinley, Harassing “Girls” at the Hard Rock: Masculinities in Sexualized 
Environments, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 19. At a recent symposium at Duke Law School on “Makeup, Identity Performance & 
Discrimination” (October 20, 2006), Paul Ades, the Associate General Counsel for Harrah’s 
Entertainment, Inc., stated that Harrah’s does hire both men and women to serve cocktails. He also 
stated that it dressed both men and women in clothing that the casino considers sexy, but he 
declined to describe what the men wear. 
 20. A high-ranking woman in the management of a casino in Laughlin, Nevada, once told me 
that she keeps a uniform for a man cocktail server in case a man applies for the job so that her 
company is not accused of discrimination against men. However, no man had ever applied. 
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cocktails at the pools of some casinos. One cocktail server explained that men 
are permitted at the pool but not on the casino floor because the inside of the 
casino is more “formal” and the pool is more “informal.”21 
Las Vegas casinos are extremely concerned about the proper “look” of their 
casinos and employees. The majority of casino employees wear uniforms which 
vary in style and color with the job. The concept is that a visitor can distinguish 
one type of employee from another by his or her uniform.22 In jobs that are 
occupied by men and women the uniforms are almost identical. For example, in 
many casinos, men and women blackjack dealers wear similar attire. Even when 
the uniforms are similar in jobs occupied by both men and women, the casino 
may have different grooming and makeup codes.23 The casino “look” reinforces 
traditional notions of the roles of men and women. 
Unlike the traditional look of other casino employees, the look of the 
cocktail server is, in some ways, contradictory. The idea that women are sexual 
objects who serve men with a smile conforms with and runs counter to 
traditional notions because it simultaneously views two separate aspects of 
women that should not exist within the same woman. The cocktail waitress is 
both a “good girl”—an uncomplaining servant to the man—and a “bad girl”—
an object of sexual gratification.24 The job requires women to perform two 
somewhat contradictory aspects of female gender simultaneously. She performs 
“good girl” submissive gendered behavior while simultaneously performing 
“bad girl” sexual flirtation. The job, therefore, requires two types of gender 
performance by the cocktail server. Challenging the exclusive hiring of sexy 
women as cocktail servers questions whether Title VII should be manipulated to 
assign women exclusively to roles of servile, sexy beings. 
III. BACKGROUND: BFOQS IN TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE 
A. BFOQ Jurisprudence 
Since the BFOQ defense shields an employer from liability for overt 
intentional discrimination and runs contrary to the purpose of Title VII, courts 
consistently have held that the defense is extremely narrow.25 By its terms, the 
BFOQ defense does not absolve an employer from race- or color-based discrimi-
nation. A Las Vegas casino, therefore, would have no defense based on the 
statutory text if it decided to open a Southern plantation-style casino with Black 
 
 21. Interview with former cocktail server, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 17, 2006). 
 22. Interview with former wedding planner, at the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, 
Nev. (June 3, 2006). 
 23. See Jespersen, 444 F. 3d at 1106–07. 
 24. For a description of the “good girl/bad girl” dichotomy, see Deborah L. Tolman & Tracy E. 
Higgins, How Being a Good Girl Can be Bad for Girls, in “BAD GIRLS”/”GOOD GIRLS”: WOMEN, SEX, AND 
POWER IN THE NINETIES 205 (Nan Bauer Maglin & Donna Marie Perry eds., 1996). See also Ann C. 
McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to Sexualized Industries, 18 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 65, 87–88 (2006) (describing the “good girl” and “bad girl” behavior of cocktail waitresses). 
 25. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201 (stating that the BFOQ defense should be applied 
narrowly); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389 (5th Cir.) (holding that female gender is not a BFOQ for a flight 
attendant), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that establishing the defense presents an employer with a “heavy burden”). 
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waiters.26 Title VII, however, does permit an employer to prove that sex, national 
origin, or religion27 is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the 
employer’s business. 
The Supreme Court first interpreted Title VII’s BFOQ defense in Dothard v. 
Rawlinson.28 The plaintiffs, a class of women prison guards, were prohibited by 
regulation from serving in maximum-security male prisons in Alabama.29 While 
emphasizing the narrowness of the BFOQ defense,30 the Court agreed that being 
male was a BFOQ for the job of prison guard in the exclusively male maximum-
security prisons in Alabama.31 The Court concluded that protecting women from 
violence was not a valid justification for the defense,32 but accepted the defense 
because of the “peculiarly inhospitable” conditions at the Alabama state prisons 
which included a “jungle atmosphere” and “rampant violence.”33 
The Court stated that the “very womanhood” of the women prison guards 
would alter their ability to do the job of maintaining security in the prison 
because there was a risk that the convicted sex offenders and other inmates 
would assault the women guards.34 Although the Court’s concept of women as 
temptresses seems anachronistic, the Court made clear that the BFOQ was not 
designed to protect women but to maintain security in the prisons. 
In Johnson Controls,35 a class of plaintiffs sued its employer, a battery 
manufacturer, because its fetal-protection policy excluded fertile women—but 
not fertile men—from jobs that exposed them to lead.36 The fetal-protection 
policy defined all women as fertile unless they had medical documentation 
establishing their infertility.37 The employer argued that adhering to the policy 
was a BFOQ because studies demonstrated that lead exposure could injure 
unborn children.38 The Supreme Court rejected Johnson Controls’ argument, 
stressing that the BFOQ defense should be applied sparingly. It noted: 
The wording of the BFOQ defense contains several terms of restriction that 
indicate that the exception reaches only special situations. The statute thus limits 
 
 26. For a discussion of the possibility of a common law BFOQ for race, see generally Michael J. 
Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or 
Color BFOQ, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2001). 
 27. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits discrimination 
against persons over 40 years old due to their age, also grants a BFOQ defense to employers. 29 
U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
 28. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 333. 
 31. Id. at 334–37. 
 32. Id. at 335. 
 33. Id. at 334–35 (quoting Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976)). Unlike well-
run state prisons, the Alabama prisons had inadequate staff and facilities and did not segregate the 
prisoners according to the dangerousness of their offenses. About ten percent of the prisoners were 
convicted sex offenders who lived in the dormitories with the other inmates. Id. at 336. 
 34. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334–36 (1977). 
 35. 499 U.S. 187 (1999). 
 36. Id. at 192. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 198. 
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the situations in which discrimination is permissible to ‘certain instances’ where 
sex discrimination is ‘reasonably necessary’ to the ‘normal operation’ of the 
‘particular’ business. Each one of these terms—certain, normal, particular—
prevents the use of general subjective standards and favors an objective, 
verifiable requirement. But the most telling term is ‘occupational’; this indicates 
that these objective, verifiable requirements must concern job-related skills and 
aptitudes.39 
The Court emphasized that the employer did not have total discretion to 
define its business to fit the BFOQ defense: 
Justice White defines ‘occupational’ as meaning related to a job. According to 
him, any discriminatory requirement imposed by an employer is ‘job-related’ 
simply because the employer has chosen to make the requirement a condition of 
employment. In effect, he argues that sterility may be an occupational 
qualification for women because Johnson Controls has chosen to require it. This 
reading of ‘occupational’ renders the word mere surplusage. ‘Qualification’ by 
itself would encompass an employer’s idiosyncratic requirements. By modifying 
‘qualification’ with ‘occupational,’ Congress narrowed the term to qualifications 
that affect an employee’s ability to do the job.40 
Moreover, the Court repeated that Dothard v. Rawlinson upheld the defense 
in order to avoid injury to the employer’s business objectives, which included 
the maintenance of prison security. The presence of women, in that case, would 
likely have caused a breach in security and therefore, would hinder the women’s 
ability to do the job.41 No such situation existed at Johnson Controls. A woman’s 
fertility had no relationship to her ability to perform the tasks required in a 
battery manufacturing plant. Therefore, because fertility was not related to the 
essence of the business and because it did not affect the women’s ability to 
perform the job, it was not a BFOQ.42 
After Johnson Controls, an employer must prove that its BFOQ defense is 
based on objective fact and that the sex or sex-differentiated job qualification 
relates to the “essence” or the “central mission” of the employer’s business and 
is objectively and verifiably necessary to the employee’s performance of job 
tasks and responsibilities.43 
B. Privacy and BFOQs 
The Supreme Court has never decided whether privacy is a proper 
justification for a BFOQ, but it has suggested that privacy may support a 
 
 39. Id. at 201. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000), made clear that discrimination on the basis of one’s ability to become 
pregnant or on the basis of one’s pregnancy is sex discrimination. Id. at 204–05. The Act states, the 
Court explained, that pregnant women must be treated the same as other employees with regard to 
their ability or inability to work. Id. 
 40. Id. at 201. 
 41. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202. 
 42. Id. at 206. 
 43. Id. at 187. 
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BFOQ.44 Some lower courts recognize a BFOQ defense where the employer 
argues that exclusive hiring of men or women for a particular job protects the 
privacy interests of patients, customers, or inmates.45 Kimberly Yuracko has 
demonstrated that courts are more likely to find a BFOQ in order to protect the 
privacy interest of the consumer than in cases in which the employer hires 
exclusively women to use sex appeal to sell a product or service.46 
While some of these cases stress the employer’s economic interest in 
protecting the privacy of its consumers, the more compelling cases deal with 
privacy of inmates and patients who either have been victims of sexual abuse or 
are vulnerable to sexual assault.47 
C. Sex, Authenticity and BFOQs 
1. Selling Sex, Sex Appeal, and BFOQs 
While courts are generally more lenient in finding BFOQs when the 
employer asserts consumer privacy as a justification,48 courts judge an 
employer’s BFOQ defense more harshly when the employer hires women or 
 
 44. In a footnote in Johnson Controls, the Court refused to reach the question of whether patient 
or client privacy would ever justify a BFOQ defense in a sex discrimination case, but it implied that 
the Court may possibly uphold privacy as a justification for a BFOQ using the “essence of the 
business test.” Id. at 206 n.4. 
 45. See Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1422 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (upholding 
BFOQ to protect privacy interests of men in men’s wash rooms); Backus v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 510 
F. Supp 1191, 1192–93 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (holding that hospital made out a BFOQ defense for its policy 
of assigning only female nurses to the obstetrical care unit because of the need to protect patients’ 
dignity and privacy), vacated on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Torres v. Wis. 
Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that BFOQ defense may be 
possible in a women’s correctional facility that hired no men for certain positions but rejecting the 
security and privacy rationales for the defense and remanding to the lower court to consider 
rehabilitation as a justification for the defense); Griffin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690, 703 
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (rejecting the defendant prison’s BFOQ defense in a maximum security male 
prison, and concluding that male inmates do not possess any protected right under the Constitution 
against being viewed while naked by correction officers of the opposite sex). 
 46. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex 
Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 151–53 (2004). 
 47. See Everson, 391 F.3d at 737 (upholding the prison’s BFOQ defense for hiring females only 
for certain positions in female prisons based on the documented history of sexual abuse and assaults 
of the female prisoners by male prison guards); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 
(3d Cir. 1996) (upholding BFOQ defense of children’s psychiatric hospital which transferred the 
female plaintiff, a child care specialist, to the night shift in order to assure there was at least one 
woman on every shift because child patients are victims of sex abuse ); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office 
of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (concluding that there is a BFOQ that at least one 
person working in a mental health facility as a Security Hospital Treatment Assistant be a woman to 
protect the privacy and security of women patients). But cf. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530, 1533 (7th Cir. 
1988) (holding that under the circumstances particular to this case privacy of women prisoners is not 
sufficient reason for BFOQ defense in hiring only women guards, but stating that business purpose 
of rehabilitation may be sufficient for a BFOQ); Griffin, 654 F. Supp. at 704 (E.D. Mich. 1982) 
(distinguishing Dothard and holding that it is not a BFOQ to hire only men guards in male maximum 
security prison because there was no evidence of mismanagement, rampant violence, or of a jungle-
like atmosphere). 
 48. See Yuracko, supra note 46, at 151–53. 
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men exclusively to use sex appeal to sell unrelated goods and services.49 In Diaz 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,50 for example, the defendant asserted a BFOQ 
defense for refusing to hire male flight attendants because customers preferred 
women as flight attendants. The Fifth Circuit rejected the defense because the 
primary function of an airline is safe transportation; excluding men from 
becoming flight attendants did not further this function.51 
Likewise, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines,52 Southwest Airlines offered a 
BFOQ defense for limiting flight attendant and ticket agent positions to women. 
Southwest argued that hiring women was necessary to its advertising campaign 
and new sexy, young image.53 The court rejected the defendant’s BFOQ defense 
because a man can perform the job of a flight attendant and ticket agent, the sex 
appeal portion of the job was tangential to its essential duties, and the company 
could not prove that it would go out of business if it hired men for those 
positions.54 The court concluded that the BFOQ defense is not applicable if sex is 
used to promote a business that is unrelated to sex.55 It stated, “[S]ex does not 
become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit female sexuality 
as a marketing tool or to better ensure profitability.”56 
Dean Bartlett agrees with Diaz and Wilson and argues that a business 
whose “essence” is selling sex may have a BFOQ defense for hiring a woman 
into a specific job that requires female sex or sex-based characteristics.57 Under 
this view, a strip club may employ the BFOQ defense when challenged for 
hiring exclusively women as exotic dancers if the essence of its business is to 
provide entertainment to heterosexual men,58 but airlines and restaurants may 
 
 49. See, e.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385; Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 292; Yuracko, supra note 46, at 196–98. 
Yuracko notes that the courts draw a sharp distinction between businesses that hire women to sell 
sex and businesses that use sex appeal to sell another product or service, a distinction that is 
recommended by Bartlett. See Yuracko, supra note 46, at 151–53. While Professor Yuracko agrees that 
customer privacy is a better justification than sexual titillation, she finds the courts’ explanation of its 
reasons for its line-drawing inadequate. Yuracko posits that a preferable explanation for the courts’ 
recognition of a privacy BFOQ is perfectionism that recognizes privacy as a negative right. In other 
words, courts do not demand that a person be private or receive privacy, but once the person claims 
a privacy right, the courts will permit the consumer his or her privacy preference even if it is not 
logical. 
 50. 442 F. 2d 385, 387–88 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). 
 51. Id. at 388. 
 52. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 53. Id. at 293. 
 54. Id. at 302. 
 55. Id. at 304. 
 56. Id. at 303. 
 57. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2575–76. 
 58. Although Kimberly Yuracko disagrees that the “essence of the business” test justifies the 
results espoused by Bartlett and followed generally by the courts, Yuracko argues that courts 
properly refuse to grant a BFOQ to businesses that use sex appeal to sell other services. See Yuracko, 
supra note 46, at 201–02. The four possible definitions of “essence” she examines are: 1) “inherent 
theory of essences”; 2) “shared meaning of essences”; 3) “employer-defined meaning of essences”; 
and 4) “customer-defined theory of essences.” Id. at 161–67. Yuracko posits that the courts’ refusal to 
permit employers to use sex appeal as a BFOQ to sell other services serves the policies of Title VII by 
permitting women workers to flourish in environments that value their intellectual capacities and do 
not judge them as sex symbols. Id. at 202. According to Yuracko, worker-focused perfectionism has 
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not use the defense if they attempt to attract customers by hiring exclusively 
women.59 Dean Bartlett makes this argument forcefully with reference to the 
lawsuits against Hooters,60 a restaurant chain that hires only female waitresses 
who wear sexually provocative clothing. She explains that employers may not 
use the BFOQ defense to sexual subordination of women in order to gain a 
competitive advantage: 
Hooters should be required to show that the sex distinctions at issue are so 
essential to its business that without them it could no longer provide the 
primary product or service it intends, lawfully, to provide. Following Diaz and 
Wilson, it should not be enough that consumers at Hooters enjoy—and even 
demonstrate through customer surveys that they enjoy—having the option of 
buying food in an environment in which sexual excitement is also provided. 
What Wilson establishes is that the sexual subordination of women cannot be 
used simply to gain competitive advantage. A business must show that its 
primary purpose is to provide sexual stimulation rather than food, drink, or 
some other service for which sex is not an essential component. This it has a 
perfect right to do, although to defend its right to discriminate on the basis of 
sex, a business will not be able to hide behind the legitimacy of ordinary 
business purposes the public deems more ‘respectable’—flying passengers, 
serving food, and so on. Once it attempts to defend its business in nonsexual 
terms, the BFOQ exception is no longer available to protect sex-specific 
requirements. The rule of thumb at the end of the day is simple: sex bars may 
subordinate women, but airlines and restaurants may not.61 
2. Authenticity and BFOQs 
The EEOC recognizes sex as a BFOQ “[w]here it is necessary for the 
purpose of authenticity or genuineness.”62 To illustrate this point, the EEOC 
states that an employer who hires an actor or actress may use sex in order to 
guarantee authenticity of the production.63 While the authenticity exception is 
limited, it conceivably offers a defense to an employer who hires entertainers 
 
two aspects: 1) an emphasis on the individual worker’s development and treatment as a rational 
actor; and 2) an understanding that women’s self-concepts are fragile. Id. 
 59. While most courts seem to agree with Bartlett that the BFOQ defense does not apply to 
employers who use sex appeal to sell a product but should protect employers whose business sells 
sex as its primary mission, Bartlett’s prediction that the sex clubs and other businesses that sell sex 
primarily would be marginalized by the law, see Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2577–78, seems not to have 
come true. Today, there are more sex clubs than in the past and there is a market for more high-
priced, “high-class” establishments. Apart from Las Vegas, strip clubs are thriving across the 
country. DANIELLE EGAN, DANCING FOR DOLLARS AND PAYING FOR LOVE: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN EXOTIC DANCERS AND THEIR REGULARS 9, 11–12 (2006). 
 60. Hooters is a restaurant chain that advertises the sex appeal of its waitresses who dress in 
tight midriff-baring shirts and shorts. Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of 
Hooters Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 191 n.134 (1997). 
The shirts, which are worn very tight, exhibit two large eyes of an owl over the breasts. Id. at 163 n.4. 
“Hooter” is also a slang term for breast. Id. at 295; Joshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII 
Sexual Harassment Protection: Can It Support a Hostile Work Environment Claim Brought By a Nude 
Dancer?, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 295 (1998). 
 61. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2578–79. 
 62. 29 C.F.R. § 1604(a)(2) (2003) (alteration added). 
 63. Id. 
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other than actors if the entertainment is sex-specific. If the entertainment is 
sexual in nature, but selling sex is not the central core of the employer’s 
business, the BFOQ defense might apply. 
For example, the New York Human Rights Appeal Board found that a 
BFOQ defense applied to the hiring of Playboy bunnies to work in the Playboy 
Club.64 The Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights 
came to the same conclusion.65 Although it is unclear whether the Board 
permitted the exclusive hiring of women as Playboy bunnies because the 
“essence” of the business of the Playboy Club was to sell sex or in order to 
promote authenticity, the Playboy Club seems to fall in between the example of 
a strip club whose central mission is to sell sexual entertainment and a theatrical 
production that hires women to act in the roles of women. 
Notwithstanding the decision of the New York Human Rights Appeal 
Board and the later decision by the Commissioner, a serious argument exists 
that being a woman is not a BFOQ for the job of Playboy Club bunny. Under the 
Johnson Controls test, using women as “bunnies” may relate to the essence of the 
business of the Playboy Club if the essence is defined as offering a “club” 
environment that caters to heterosexual men by emphasizing female sexuality. 
The essence of the business can be defined more broadly, however, to include 
serving food and drinks and an opportunity for a primarily male clientele to 
relax and gamble, rather than selling female sexuality. 
Even if the essence is to sell female sexuality, the Playboy Club may have 
difficulty proving the second part of the Johnson Controls test: that being a 
woman is objectively and verifiably necessary to the performance of the job 
tasks and responsibilities of the Playboy bunny. If the tasks of a Playboy bunny 
include serving food and drinks to customers, there is no question that both men 
and women are capable of performing these job requirements. A good argument 
can be made that the Playboy Club uses sex appeal to sell other unrelated 
products, just as Pan Am and Southwest Airlines attempted to do when it hired 
only women as flight attendants. The Playboy bunny is not selling sex in the 
same way that a dancer in an exotic dance club is. Rather, the Playboy Club uses 
her sex appeal to sell other products. 
A counterargument would assert that Playboy bunnies are at the very core 
of the Playboy Club. If the Playboy Club were forced to hire men into these jobs, 
the men could not perform as bunnies because they lack the feminine sex appeal 
which is central to the mission of the Playboy Club. Thus, the argument would 
be threefold: 1) rather than using sex appeal to serve other products, sex appeal 
is central to the product and the identity of the Playboy Club; 2) the clientele 
would likely desert the Playboy Club without the female bunnies; and 3) unlike 
 
 64. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 301 (citing St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case No. 
CFS 22618-70 (N.Y. Human Rights Appeals Bd., 1971) (dicta); Weber v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 
774, Case No. DFS 22619-70 (N.Y. Human Rights Appeals Bd., 1971) (dicta)); Playboy Club Int’l, Inc. 
v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int’l Union, 321 F. Supp. 704, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(assuming the legality of the appearance rules for Playboy bunnies). 
 65. Aromi v. Playboy Club, Inc. et. al., Case No. X-E-ADMS-42884-761 (N.Y. State Div. Human 
Rights Aug. 1, 1985) (concluding that having the “bunny image” is a BFOQ and stating that it is 
bound by the St. Cross and Weber cases), available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/misc/aromi.pdf, at 
2. 
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Pan Am and Southwest Airlines, the focus of the Playboy Club is entertainment. 
In order to accomplish the goal of entertaining its clientele, the Playboy Club 
must have the freedom to entertain in a manner desired by its male clientele. 
This position incorporates both the arguments that being a woman is 
related to the “essence” of the business and that authenticity requires that 
women be bunnies. The Playboy Club may argue that a Playboy bunny has a 
specific feminine identity that customers associate with the organization. If the 
club were to permit men to serve as bunnies, the image and identity of the 
Playboy bunny would be altered or destroyed. Because the image and identity 
are closely linked to the hedonistic pleasures of heterosexual men, women by 
their very womanhood are exclusively able to serve as Playboy bunnies. If men 
were hired into the positions as Playboy bunnies, the authentic or genuine 
identity of the Playboy Club would be altered. 
IV. APPLYING THE BFOQ DEFENSE TO COCKTAIL SERVERS: 
LAW AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The privacy, sex appeal, and authenticity cases shed light on the analysis 
that courts should employ in determining whether casinos have a BFOQ defense 
to Title VII for hiring exclusively women as cocktail servers. From the privacy 
cases, the casinos are likely to borrow the argument that they will lose profits if 
they do not offer sexy women in the role of cocktail waitress. Although this 
argument is sometimes successful in combination with an asserted privacy 
interest of the customer, alone it would be difficult to make. If, however, this 
argument were combined with a claim that selling sexy entertainment is the 
“essence” of the business or that authenticity requires a finding of a BFOQ, it 
may have some force. 
A second argument the casinos will probably make relates to the “essence 
of the business.” The casinos may argue that the Pan Am and Southwest Airlines 
cases are distinguishable because the essence of the business of an airline is the 
safe transport of passengers. Unlike airlines and other companies that sell a 
service or product unrelated to sex appeal, casinos provide young, attractive 
cocktail servers to entertain heterosexual men. The casino owners will analogize 
their businesses to that of the Playboy Clubs arguing that, like the Playboy 
bunnies, casino cocktail servers offer entertainment and feminine appeal which 
is objectively necessary to perform the job responsibilities of taking care of the 
male customers. 
Finally, this argument may combine with the courts’ recognition that a 
need for authenticity can create a successful BFOQ defense. The casinos are 
likely to argue that the cocktail servers are similar to actresses who play the role 
of sexy handmaidens who serve the patrons as they gamble. Moreover, they 
probably will argue that cocktail servers must meet certain criteria in order to 
please the customer. The uniforms and dress codes required of cocktail servers 
reinforce the argument that being a woman with a certain personality and 
appearance is a BFOQ for the job of cocktail server. These tight-fitting uniforms 
emphasize the cocktail servers’ youth and sexuality and confirm that the 
women’s role is to serve the male gambler. Men who come to the casinos step 
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into a bubble of fantasy. Cocktail waitresses, dressed in sexy uniforms, work to 
fulfill the fantasy.66 
The casinos’ arguments may or may not prevail. In response, a good 
argument exists that, unlike exotic dancers in a gentlemen’s club, a cocktail 
server does not engage in sexual repartee or contact with the patrons. The 
cocktail servers’ job is to serve male and female patrons in an efficient and 
friendly manner. If this definition of job responsibilities prevails, casinos may 
have difficulty convincing a judge that womanhood is objectively and verifiably 
necessary to perform the job tasks. In light of this problem, the casinos will 
probably attempt to define the job in sexual terms or to describe the essence of 
the business as entertainment. They are likely to maintain that sexy women 
cocktail servers are part of the entertainment offered to casino clientele. 
Under the tests established in Johnson Controls, Diaz, and Southwest Airlines, 
if the essence of the casino business is defined as providing gaming 
opportunities to customers, limiting cocktail server positions to sexy young 
women appears unrelated to this mission. Moreover, even if the central mission 
is defined more broadly as “sexy entertainment,” a definition that would not 
apply to most casinos unless the casino limits the casino floors to adults, the 
argument that only women can perform the tasks of the job is weak. 
While it is conceivable that a particular casino could build its business 
around a sexual image and that all casino workers would necessarily further the 
sexy image, that casino does not exist. Most casinos require a combination of 
sexy and conservative dress and grooming of its employees. For employees 
other than cocktail servers, casinos impose uniform dress and grooming 
requirements that are rather conservative. Conservative hairstyles, nail polish 
and hair color are required.67 Men are forbidden from wearing colored nail 
polish.68 And, even though the casinos require that cocktail waitresses wear 
skimpy sexy uniforms, some of the grooming requirements of the cocktail 
waitresses are quite conservative. For example, the casino regulates the color of 
the hair and nail polish to present a more conservative uniform image.69 
Perhaps a more important question is how the courts should interpret the 
law—i.e., whether application of a BFOQ defense furthers Title VII’s policies. 
This discussion is complex because the purposes and policies underlying Title 
VII point in different directions depending on what values we consider most 
precious. Arguments against recognizing the BFOQ focus on the dignitary 
interests of women as a group, including: (1) the subordination of individual 
women who serve as cocktail waitresses as well as the subordination of women 
as a group; (2) the possibility that other better jobs would open up to women 
 
 66. It is interesting that other casino workers have dress and appearance codes that require the 
workers to wear conservative clothing, hairstyles and makeup. In a sense the casino cocktail 
waitress, although she wears what many would consider a racy costume, is considered “classy” in 
Las Vegas, perhaps a throwback to the old concept of showgirls. See, e.g., Dress, Appearance, and 
Grooming Codes of the following casinos in Las Vegas: Aladdin, Paris/Bally’s, Binion’s, Boyd 
Gaming, Frontier, MGM Grand, Monte Carlo, Palms, Station Casinos, Venetian (on file with author). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Interviews with former cocktail servers, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 26 and 27, 2005; May 17, 
2006); interview with bar back, in Las Vegas, Nev. (June 16, 2006). 
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cocktail waitresses if the BFOQ does not exist; and (3) the rights of individual 
men who would be hired to serve cocktails if they were permitted to do so. 
Arguments in favor of recognizing a BFOQ would emphasize: (1) the individual 
woman’s right to sell her sex appeal for economic gain; (2) the woman and her 
family’s economic interests; and (3) the rights of casino owners to define their 
businesses. 
A. Interests Opposing a BFOQ Defense 
Professor Yuracko approves of the courts’ reluctance to find sex as a BFOQ 
in cases such as Pan Am and Southwest Airlines.70 Although she believes that the 
“essence of the business” test does not explain the line drawing between 
businesses that sell sex appeal and businesses that sell sex, she believes that the 
courts’ jurisprudence reflects a type of perfectionism.71 She argues that 
recognizing a BFOQ defense to hire women as sexual titillation may impede the 
progress of women as a group in achieving their full intellectual potential.72 
Citing a study that demonstrates that dressing women in sexy apparel impairs 
their intellectual functioning, Yuracko opines that women will flourish if 
employers emphasize intellectual abilities rather than sexual attraction.73 
Similarly, Dean Bartlett argues for limiting the BFOQ defense to very 
narrow circumstances. She believes that by being viewed as sex symbols women 
are subordinated and that the law should not approve of the subordination by 
permitting businesses to sell their products through the use of female sex 
appeal.74 Consequently, she would limit the BFOQ defense to legal businesses 
that directly sell sex.75 According to these views, a decision refusing to extend 
the BFOQ defense to cover the exclusive hiring of women in casinos would 
reduce the stigmatization of women as sex symbols and encourage women to 
flourish through emphasis of their intellectual capacities. 
Defining the cocktail server job as sexualized subordinates women as a 
group. Women in general would have greater dignity if courts decided not to 
sanction the casinos’ subjugation of women through the exclusive hiring of sexy 
women as cocktail waitresses. Sanctioning the BFOQ defense would not only 
subordinate women cocktail servers as a group, but may also lead to more 
aggressive use of the defense.76 What would prevent employers from defining 
their product or services as particularly feminine or masculine? A law firm 
could argue that it hires only men who are aggressive litigators because the 
clients prefer male lawyers. Schools could hire only women as teachers because 
women are arguably more child-oriented or because the parents prefer female 
teachers. The law should not reinforce sexual subjugation of women or rely on 
stereotyping to determine which jobs are feminine and masculine. 
 
 70. See Yuracko, supra note 46, at 212–13. 
 71. Id. at 172–79. 
 72. Id. at 210. 
 73. Id. at 208–09, 210–12. 
 74. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2576. 
 75. Id. at 2575. 
 76. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 46, at 201 for an articulation of this argument. 
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B. Interests Favoring a BFOQ Defense 
On the other hand, some women view commodification as a means to an 
end.77 These women may prefer the power to decide to sell their sexuality as a 
commodity. There is increasing commodification of personal services and many 
feminists argue that commodification is not always a bad thing.78 Las Vegas 
casinos offer good jobs to women cocktail waitresses. Many of these women use 
these jobs to raise families or to put themselves through university or graduate 
school. These jobs, which have flexible hours and are well-paid, can give women 
the freedom to pursue opportunities that allow them to develop their 
intellectual abilities and flourish.79 
Moreover, within certain limits imposed by Title VII, business owners have 
the right to define their own businesses. Casinos use the cocktail servers as “eye 
candy” to attract visitors to the casino and to keep patrons happy and gambling. 
The casinos’ exclusive hiring of women as cocktail servers, and the dressing of 
women cocktail servers in sexy attire, distinguishes the Nevada casinos from 
other gaming establishments. In Nevada, for instance, it is possible to play slot 
machines in grocery stores that do not have sexy women serving cocktails. In 
fact, the women—and it usually is women—who work in the supermarkets in 
Las Vegas in the slot machine section are almost always senior citizens. 
Moreover, in Nevada, gaming in the form of video poker exists in a number of 
bar/restaurant establishments that do not limit their cocktail servers to young 
women dressed in skimpy outfits. Outside of Nevada, casinos operated by 
Indian tribes or on riverboats in the Mississippi have a different atmosphere. 
Consequently, Nevada casino owners have a legitimate argument that their 
establishments are unique: they offer gaming in a “classier,” more sexualized 
environment. 
C. Choosing Which Set of Interests to Protect 
The above arguments raise legitimate questions concerning which 
interpretation of the BFOQ defense would better further the policies of Title VII. 
Because the casinos would have difficulty proving that being a sexy woman is a 
BFOQ under the test articulated in Johnson Controls and because there are strong 
policy arguments in favor of not expanding the use of the BFOQ in this 
situation, casinos should not be able to justify a BFOQ defense. Perhaps the best 
reason for refusing to recognize a BFOQ defense is that job segregation leads to 
 
 77. “Commodification” includes the selling of one’s sex or sex appeal for money. See generally 
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, eds., 2005). 
 78. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Taking Money for Bodily Services, in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 77, at 243 (arguing that many professionals sell their services for 
money); Ann Lucas, The Currency of Sex: Prostitution, Law and Commodification, in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION, supra note 77, at 255 (arguing that like wisdom sold by an expert, sex is not used 
up or diminished by sales). See also McGinley, supra note 24, at 95 n.188. 
 79. A number of law students at Boyd School of Law work their way through school as cocktail 
servers or have been cocktail servers in the past. Interviews of law students who were former 
cocktail waitresses or who worked as waitresses during law school, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 26 and 
27, 2005) (on file with the author). 
09__MCGINLEY.DOC 2/8/2007 2:05 PM 
274 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 14:257 2007 
job stratification, lower salaries, and sexual harassment of women.80 While 
women serve as cocktail servers, men fill the jobs of casino hosts. The host jobs, 
which are highly coveted, are better paid and more respected than the jobs of 
cocktail server.81 A decision not to permit the BFOQ defense for cocktail server 
positions may create jobs for men in those positions and simultaneously open 
up jobs for women as casino hosts. Given the harms of job segregation, deciding 
that womanhood is not a BFOQ for the job of cocktail server does little relative 
harm to casino employers. While it imposes some limits on the casino, it does 
not significantly intrude upon the owner’s ability to direct his or her business. 
The casino’s primary business is gaming, not sexual entertainment. There is no 
evidence that the casino business would fail if the cocktail servers were both 
men and women. 
More importantly, the real harm to women cocktail servers does not 
necessarily result from the sexualization of women on the job. The injury results 
from the different roles assigned to men and women, both to employees and 
customers. The men customers play the role of sexual aggressors while the 
women cocktail servers play the role of sexual beings whose purpose is to serve 
the men. This stereotyping reinforces the traditional notion of the separate 
spheres of men and women—men as rational beings who still have the authority 
to engage in sexual predation and women as nothing other than emotionally 
driven, sexual objects.82 In the traditional workplace, even though male sexuality 
existed, it was invisible because it was the norm.83 Many jobs held by women 
stress physical attractiveness.84 When a job has a sexual component, people 
assume that there are few other qualifications needed for the job.85 While 
women’s jobs often have a sexual component, men are not viewed as inherently 
sexual at work.86 A workplace that intentionally sexualizes men would challenge 
the traditional notion that women are sexual objects and men are rational beings 
who are driven to express their sexual urges because of women’s behavior. If 
such a workplace existed, it would jar the senses and clarify the aspect of 
performance involved in this sexualization. Since the job of cocktail server 
requires submissiveness and servility, having men serve cocktails would 
demonstrate that men can also play the role of submissive servant, a 
contradiction to ordinary gender roles.87 
 
 80. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L. J. 2061, 2066, 2140 (2003) 
(demonstrating that workers are more likely to be harassed where job segregation occurs). 
 81. Interview of former cocktail server, in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 17, 2006) (on file with the 
author). 
 82. See Christine L. Williams & Dana M. Britton, Sexuality and Work, in INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS 1, 3 (Craig Calhoun & George Ritzer eds., McGraw-Hill Primis 1995) (explaining that Max 
Weber assigned men to the public sphere, which includes work and organizations and women to the 
private sphere, which includes family and sexuality). 
 83. Id. at 8. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (describing research by sociologist Barbara Gutek). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Casinos hiring men as cocktail servers will have to be extremely careful that they do not 
disproportionately hire men of color. Such a hiring pattern could lead to pernicious results—
promotion of the idea that women and men of color need to be submissive to white men. 
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Casino operators should be given two choices: (1) de-sexualize the job of 
cocktail server and hire both men and women or (2) keep the sexual component 
of the job, hire both men and women, and dress them in equally sexy outfits. If 
both men and women are treated as sexual beings, invisible male sexuality will 
become more visible and the jobs will likely subjugate women less. Customers 
will view both men and women through the sexual lens. This treatment will 
offer men jobs as sexy workers and will challenge the assumption that it is a 
woman’s role alone to serve as a sexual object. A decision refusing the BFOQ 
defense while simultaneously permitting employers to dress men and women 
cocktail servers in sexually provocative clothing reaches the proper balance 
between the rights of both men and women and the interests of employers. 
V. COCKTAIL SERVER’S DRESS AND GROOMING REQUIREMENTS AFTER JESPERSEN 
When faced with a Title VII challenge to dress or appearance codes that 
differentiate between men and women, courts employ a number of different 
tests, but no court has held that differences in dress codes for men and women 
constitute facial discrimination under Title VII. A few courts conclude that, 
because dress and appearance codes apply to mutable characteristics within the 
employee’s control, the codes are permissible.88 Other courts hold that dress 
codes make such a minimal incursion into a person’s rights that they are 
permissible if reasonable.89 The majority of courts permit sex-differentiated dress 
and appearance codes if the burdens on women and men are relatively equal;90 
 
 88. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tele. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination based on mutable characteristics); Baker v. Cal. Land 
Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1974) (regulating men’s hair length did not violate Title VII 
because it was not an immutable characteristic). The trial court in Jespersen adopted the mutable 
characteristic argument as an alternative holding. See Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. 
 89. See, e.g., Wiseley v. Harrah’s Entm’t Inc., 94 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 402 (D.N.J. 2004) 
(concluding that grooming policies fall outside of the purview of Title VII). 
 90. While most courts use the equal burdens test, Bartlett argues that courts’ attempts to weigh 
the burdens have led to poor results. Bartlett argues that it is impossible to disregard and transcend 
community norms, see Bartlett, supra note 8, at 2568, and she proposes that courts use community 
norms in a more self-conscious way to determine which norms impose burdens “that disadvantage 
members of one sex in relation to the other,” id. at 2569. She proposes that courts require employers 
using dress codes that confer a disadvantage on one group to justify the codes by proving that they 
are a BFOQ. Id. at 2572. In this case, where there are both men and women in the job, the BFOQ 
defense would require that the dress or appearance code be necessary to the essence of the 
employer’s business. Id. at 2578. According to Bartlett, once the BFOQ defense is applicable, the 
community norms “constitute the context within which the employer must establish whether its 
discriminatory rule is necessary to its essential business purpose.” Id. at 2573. Thus, a BFOQ defense 
would not justify the exclusive hiring of women (or sexy women) as stewardesses or waitresses in 
order to attract men customers because the primary business of an airline or restaurant is not to sell 
sex, but to transport passengers or feed customers. Id. at 2573–75. In contrast, in the businesses 
whose primary purpose is to offer sex as a commodity for sale the employer could prevail by posing 
the BFOQ defense. Id. at 2576–77. Bartlett reasons that, although these workplaces subordinate 
women as sexual objects, the combination of the law’s pressure in narrowing the BFOQ defense and 
community norms that impose limits on the types of businesses that employers are willing to defend 
would marginalize businesses that sell female sex. See id. at 2577–78. The underlying premise of 
Bartlett’s recommendation is that strip clubs subordinate women dancers, as would other employers 
if they were permitted to require sex appeal for jobs that sell unrelated services and goods. Since 
Bartlett’s article, however, there has emerged feminist scholarship that would refute this premise. 
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however, if the burdens on one sex outweigh those on another sex, courts find 
that the dress or appearance code violates Title VII.91 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 92 added an interesting twist to the 
jurisprudence. Darlene Jespersen performed successfully as a bartender at 
Harrah’s Casino in Reno, Nevada, for almost twenty-one years.93 She had a loyal 
following of regular customers who bought drinks at her bar.94 When Harrah’s 
encouraged its female bartenders to wear makeup during the 1980s and 1990s, 
Jespersen found that wearing makeup made her feel “sick, degraded, exposed 
and violated;” she felt “‘dolled up,’” like a sex object, stripped of her dignity, 
and less effective at work.95 
In February 2000, the defendant instituted the “‘Beverage Department 
Image Transformation’” program.96 The purpose was to create a “‘brand 
standard of excellence.’”97 The “Personal Best” program, as Harrah’s described 
it, included general appearance standards applicable to all employees and 
particular sex-specific appearance standards.98 The standards required that 
 
See KATHERINE FRANK, G-STRINGS, AND SYMPATHY: STRIP CLUB REGULARS AND MALE DESIRE (2002); 
DANIELLE EGAN, DANCING FOR DOLLARS AND PAYING FOR LOVE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXOTIC 
DANCERS AND THEIR REGULARS (2006) (arguing that it is empowering, not subordinating, for women 
to dance in strip clubs). 
 91. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that it is 
disparate treatment to require women to keep their maximum weight to those prescribed on weight 
table for women of medium build while requiring men to maintain a maximum weight on a weight 
table for men of large build). 
 92. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 93. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (D. Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en 
banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 444 F.3d 1104 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
 94. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004 ), reh’g en banc granted, 
409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir., 2005), and vacated, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. The standards state: 
All Beverage Service Personnel, in addition to being friendly, polite, courteous and 
responsive to our customer’s needs, must possess the ability to physically perform the 
essential factors of the job as set forth in the standard job descriptions. They must be well 
groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with 
maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform. Additional factors to be 
considered include, but are not limited to, hair styles, overall body contour, and degree of 
comfort the employee projects while wearing the uniform. 
* * * 
Beverage Bartenders and Barbacks will adhere to these additional guidelines: 
• Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/ female): 
o Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire. 
o Jewelry, if issued, must be worn. Otherwise, tasteful and simple jewelry is permitted; 
no large chokers, chains or bracelets. 
o No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted. 
• Males: 
o Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited. 
o Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. No 
colored polish is permitted. 
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women’s hair be styled, teased, or curled, and that men’s hair be short.99 This 
standard forbade men from wearing makeup and colored nail polish, but did 
not initially require women to wear makeup.100 Eventually, Harrah’s amended 
the standard to require women to wear makeup.101 
Harrah’s also instituted “Personal Best” training for its employees.102 Once 
the professional trainers completed the training, they photographed each 
employee and placed the photos into the employees’ files. Supervisory 
employees used these photographs to judge whether each employee complied 
with the standards every day.103 Jespersen refused to wear makeup and Harrah’s 
fired her.104 She sued, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act.105 The federal district court granted Harrah’s motion for 
summary judgment.106 The court concluded that the policy did not impose 
greater burdens on women than on men;107 that “the makeup requirement 
involves a mutable characteristic, which does not infringe on equal employment 
opportunities due to one’s sex”;108 and, finally, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which held that discrimination because 
of a woman’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes is prohibited by Title VII,109 
does not support a cause of action for discriminatory dress and appearance 
codes.110 The court did not reach the question of whether the makeup 
requirement was a BFOQ.111 
 
o Eye and facial makeup is not permitted. 
o Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles. 
• Females: 
o Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn down 
at all times, no exceptions. 
o Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee’s skin tone. No 
runs. 
o Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or length. 
o Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles. 
o Make up (face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in 
complimentary [sic] colors. Lip color must be worn at all times. (emphasis added). 
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added by court). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 101. Id. at 1078, n.2. The amended policy stated: “make up (foundation/concealer and/or face 
powder, as well as blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary colors,” 
and that “lip color must be worn at all times.” Id. 
 102. Id. at 1078. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1196. 
 107. Id. at 1193. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that sex stereotyping is evidence of illegal sex discrimination). 
 110. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d. at 1193. 
 111. Id. at 1194. 
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On appeal, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision with one dissent.112 In a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit 
once again affirmed,113 over two vigorous dissents by Judges Pregerson and 
Kozinski.114 The majority agreed that the proper test in a dress and appearance 
policy case is whether the policy imposes unequal burdens on men and women. 
According to the majority, Jespersen’s testimony that she found the makeup 
requirement burdensome was merely her subjective response to the policy and 
did not establish that the policy’s burdens were unequal.115 The majority looked 
at the entire appearance standard and concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence in the record to prove a greater burden on women. The court left open 
the possibility that, in a future case, a plaintiff could prove that the policy 
imposed unequal burdens on women and men.116 
Perhaps more important to the dress codes of cocktail servers in Nevada 
casinos, the court held that future plaintiffs may potentially employ the Price 
Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory to attack a dress code that intentionally 
stereotypes a person because of sex.117 The majority concluded, however, that 
Harrah’s dress code did not stereotype women because of their sex and that 
there was no evidence that the dress code was motivated by an interest in 
treating women as sex objects.118 In reaching this conclusion, the majority noted 
that the makeup requirement did not objectively interfere with a woman’s 
ability to perform the job as bartender.119 The court also noted that the dress code 
required of men and women bartenders was mostly unisex.120 The uniform 
included non-skid black shoes, and it fully covered the bodies of both men and 
women; there was no intention to make the women’s uniform sexually 
 
 112. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1076. The two judge majority concluded that the test in the Ninth 
Circuit is the “unequal burdens” test. It held that the proper measure was the entire appearance 
standard as applicable to men and women rather than the makeup requirement alone and noted that 
the plaintiff had not placed into the record any evidence demonstrating that there was a heavier 
burden imposed on women than on men employees. Id. at 1081. In contravention of the district court 
judge’s decision, the two judge majority noted that even if there is a mutable characteristic and there 
is an unequal burden placed on women than on men, the employer would be required to prove that 
the sex-differentiated requirement was a BFOQ. Id. at 1080. The majority also declined to apply Price 
Waterhouse to a dress code case. Id. at 1082–83. The dissent argued that the plaintiff presented a 
question of material fact as to whether the employer’s appearance standards placed a heavier 
burden on women. Id. at 1085 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the plaintiff 
presented a question of material fact under the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping doctrine because 
makeup historically has been used as a tool of subordination of women. Id. at 1083–84. The 
dissenting judge disputed the approach taken by the majority. In determining whether unequal 
burdens existed, the dissent would have compared the requirement that women wear makeup 
against the prohibition against men’s wearing of makeup, rather than considering the entire 
appearance code and its overall burdens on men and women respectively. Id. at 1085–86. 
 113. 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 114. Of the eleven judges voting, seven were in the majority and four dissented. Id. at 1104. 
 115. See id. at 1110–11. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 1113. 
 118. Id. at 1112. 
 119. Id. at 1112. 
 120. Id. 
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provocative.121 Moreover, this was not a case of sexual harassment because of the 
plaintiff’s failure to conform to feminine norms of dress or behavior.122 
According to the court, Jespersen’s evidence, which showed her subjective 
revulsion to the makeup requirement, did not establish that Harrah’s intended 
to sex stereotype women in general by imposing the makeup requirement.123 
Thus, the definition and evolution of the law of sex stereotyping and dress and 
appearance codes are left open to future lawsuits.124 
After Jespersen’s clarification that a cause of action under Price Waterhouse 
may exist if employers impose dress or appearance codes intentionally to 
stereotype employees because of their sex, an employer who hires exclusively 
men or women and dresses them in sexy, sex-stereotyping uniforms will likely 
have to prove that the dress code is a BFOQ in order to escape liability under 
Title VII. There can be little debate that current dress and appearance codes for 
cocktail servers intentionally stereotype women employees because of their sex. 
The uniforms are low cut, skimpy, and very sexy. This article has argued that 
being a sexy woman should not be a BFOQ for a cocktail server job in a Las 
Vegas casino or similar establishment. Casino employers, therefore, must give 
equal employment opportunities to men and women applying for jobs as 
cocktail servers. Moreover, if the casinos have a reputation of hiring only 
women to fill these jobs, they are potentially liable for a failure to hire men even 
if they receive few or no applications from men.125 A perception of gender bias 
and sexualization of women may in fact have created a disincentive for men to 
apply for the positions. Casinos, therefore, should make affirmative efforts to 
recruit and hire men as cocktail servers to countermand the persistent, historical 
practice of hiring only women to serve cocktails.126 
 
 121. Id. The court distinguished E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 610–11 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (holding a cause of action existed under Title VII where the employer forced the female lobby 
attendant to wear a sexually provocative outfit that subjected her to customer harassment). 
 122. Id. at 1113. The court distinguished both Rene v. MGM Grant Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063–
64 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a cause of action under Title VII existed where a man is sexually 
harassed because he does not conform to the sexual stereotypes of masculinity), and Nichols v. Azteca 
Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a cause of action under Price 
Waterhouse existed because the plaintiff, a male waiter, was harassed for his feminine mannerisms). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 386–87 (1986) (sanctioning use of multiple regression 
analysis to prove employment discrimination); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 
339–40 n.20 (1977) (stating statistics can be used to prove a pattern and practice of discrimination). 
Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308–09 (1977) (recommending courts 
use a comparison between the racial composition of persons holding jobs in the defendant’s 
workforce with the racial composition of the qualified individuals in the relevant labor market), with 
EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2000) (assuming it was proper for 
the lower court to compare the number of women in the job with those in the labor pool rather than 
with those who applied for the jobs because there was evidence that women did not apply for the 
jobs as a result of the history of discrimination). 
 126. Efforts to hire men into jobs that are exclusively held by women are permissible under Title 
VII so long as sex is only one factor considered in the decision to hire a man cocktail server. See 
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641–42 (1987) (upholding a voluntary affirmative action 
plan that took sex as one of several factors into account in evaluating qualified applicants for the 
job). 
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Once the casinos hire men to serve cocktails, Jespersen raises the additional 
question of what dress codes and appearance standards would be permissible 
for cocktail servers. For example, may casinos impose sex-specific dress codes 
on men and women cocktail servers that stereotype them because of sex? 
Jespersen is subject to multiple interpretations, and the court has left open the 
possibility that future cases will define the law of dress and appearance codes 
and sex stereotyping.127 
First, Jespersen may preclude all dress and appearance codes that sexually 
stereotype men or women—or both—in a sexually provocative manner. If 
Jespersen is interpreted this way, casinos would violate Title VII either by 
imposing different sex-specific sexually provocative uniforms on men and 
women, or by imposing the same sexually provocative uniform, on both men 
and women. In other words, Jespersen could stand for the proposition that 
requiring sexy dressing of employees is prohibited unless the employer 
establishes a BFOQ. In response to dissenting Judge Pregerson’s criticism that 
the unequal burden test permits sex stereotyping of both sexes, the majority 
implies that even if applied equally, dress codes that sex stereotype both sexes 
may not be permissible under Price Waterhouse.128 This interpretation would 
likely apply to industries other than entertainment and to jobs that do not 
require the employee to engage in a performance. Thus, a law firm would not be 
permitted to require both its male and female associates to dress in sexy garb. If 
this interpretation applied to casinos and similar establishments, it would also 
eliminate costumes that are sexually provocative from the casino floors. Like the 
bartenders in Jespersen, cocktail servers would dress in unisex uniforms except 
for certain grooming standards that do not objectively interfere with employees’ 
ability to work. While this result would eliminate the obvious sexual 
subrogation of women in casino dress codes, it would continue to reinforce 
established cultural norms concerning what grooming standards “objectively” 
impede an individual’s ability to work. Thus, while the interpretation eliminates 
the sexualizing of women as a class, it does not protect the autonomy of 
individuals who find the imposition of cultural norms oppressive.129 
Moreover, casino owners would find this requirement a drab and colorless 
imposition on the “bubble of fantasy” that they are attempting to create. Las 
Vegas casinos would argue that they exist because human beings need an escape 
from the rigid rules imposed on them in their “real” lives. Furthermore, at least 
some women cocktail servers welcome the opportunity to wear the flesh-
exposing uniforms because they can earn substantially more in tips. There is, no 
doubt, an element of performance in the job of casino cocktail waitress that is 
lacking in the job of waitress in a greasy spoon restaurant. 
A second possible interpretation of Jespersen is that it forbids the use of 
gender-bending dress and appearance codes. In other words, because Harrah’s 
makeup requirement is consistent with cultural norms and reinforces expected 
gendered grooming, it will not objectively inhibit a woman or a man’s ability to 
 
 127. 444 F.3d at 1112. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, supra note 15, for a detailed discussion of employee 
autonomy and dress codes. 
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do the job. A code that requires short cropped hair on women and curled hair 
and makeup on men, however, may objectively inhibit the employee’s ability to 
do the job and is therefore illegal. While Las Vegas sees itself as very free 
sexually, it actually projects a free heterosexual image, by suppressing a 
homosexual image.130 It flaunts its heterosexual identification through a 
commodified, sexualized view of women, but avoids the reality of 
homosexuality.131 At least insofar as the casinos are concerned, “desire Las Vegas 
style” means heterosexual men’s desire for women.132 A reading of Jespersen that 
prohibits gender-bending dress codes would reinforce these one-sided norms, 
which emphasize sexy young women as objects of heterosexual desire. A 
gender-bending dress code in Las Vegas may actually do more to challenge 
traditional notions of a woman as a sex object than unisex dressing. 
Another interpretation of Jespersen would prohibit dress and grooming 
codes that are sufficiently sexually provocative to create an opportunity for 
customers to harass employees because of sex. This interpretation may also be 
too restrictive. While casinos should be liable for sexual harassment of cocktail 
servers by customers that casinos negligently permit to occur,133 casinos should 
be permitted to define the cocktail server’s job as part-performance even though 
being a woman is not a BFOQ for the job. The sexually provocative dress code, 
imposed equally on men and women, may enhance the performance. 
A preferable reading of Jespersen would permit casinos and other industries 
that provide entertainment to adopt sexually provocative dress requirements for 
both men and women cocktail servers, as long as the codes treat both men and 
women as sexual subjects. Because men are not ordinarily considered sexual 
objects, the dressing of male cocktail waiters in sexually explicit uniforms would 
create a reaction of surprise and humor,134 emphasizing that the job of cocktail 
server entails a performance and the server’s uniform enhances the ability of the 
server to perform. This reaction makes the viewer more aware of the sexual 
commodification of women that surrounds us. It serves as a playful reminder of 
the viewer’s acceptance of the woman’s role as a sexual temptress and the man’s 
role as an aggressor, and challenges, rather than reinforces, sexual stereotypes 
without unduly restricting the freedom of employers.135 
 
 130. See Joan W. Howarth, Adventures in Heteronormativity: The Straight Line from Liberace to 
Lawrence, 5 NEV. L.J. 260, 261 (2004). 
 131. See id. 
 132. There has been minimal incursion into this “old fashioned” concept in Las Vegas. Two 
shows demonstrating men as “beefcake”—”Chippendales” and the “Thunder from Down Under”—
are advertised to appeal to heterosexual women consumers. The Cirque du Soleil has a show entitled 
“Zumanity” that features homosexual as well as heterosexual couples engaging in erotic behavior. 
These three shows stand out among a plethora of shows exhibiting female sexuality. 
 133. See generally McGinley, supra note 18; McGinley, supra note 24. 
 134. On a personal note, I experienced a similar reaction upon entering a casino that has men 
performers dressed as “beefcake.” The men were dressed in slacks and a bow tie, but no shirt. The 
men selected for the performance had had their body hair waxed and were extremely muscular. My 
reaction, frankly, was surprise and some discomfort. The men who bared their chests appeared 
almost more naked to me than the women cocktail servers who wore very skimpy costumes. 
 135. There is a potential challenge to this proposal by an older worker who is considered not 
sufficiently sexy for the job. The older worker could conceivably allege that the casino’s requirement 
that a cocktail server be “sexy” and wear a sexy uniform has a disparate impact on men and women 
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To achieve the goal of challenging sexual stereotypes, casinos should 
consider the effect that the proposed uniforms would have on men and women. 
For example, sexy costumes should not denote a power differential between 
men and women. Because men are stereotypically considered sexy when 
powerful, it would not suffice to put men in suits and women in skimpy outfits. 
Rather, in order to challenge the concept of women exclusively as sex objects, 
casino employers must also dress men in uniforms that portray them as sex 
objects. Moreover, the same uniform on both men and women would often 
impose unequal effects because of cultural norms about which parts of men’s 
and women’s exposed bodies, respectively, are considered erotic. Casinos 
should avoid dress requirements on men and women that might be humiliating 
to one group because of social norms, but not bothersome to the other. For 
example, a decision to go without a shirt would eroticize and humiliate women 
more than men. A requirement that both men and women shave their heads 
would, likewise, impose a heavier burden on women than on men. 
Casinos should also ensure relative comfort of uniforms for men and 
women. Requiring high heels for women and flat shoes for men, for example, 
would impose a heavier burden on women because of the discomfort and 
difficulty of serving cocktails in high heels, even though high heels may be 
“gender appropriate” for women according to community norms.136 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Employers who use sex appeal to entertain their customers should have the 
right to do so. That right, however, should not extend to the selling of female 
sexuality without the selling of its male counterpart. A fair reading of Title VII 
permits an extremely narrow BFOQ defense where the very womanhood or 
manhood is essential to perform the job tasks. Interpreting the BFOQ defense 
very narrowly is consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act and will 
limit the spread of job segregation by sex. Because both women and men can 
easily perform the tasks and responsibilities of a cocktail server in a Las Vegas 
 
because of their age. See Smith v. City of Jackson (Miss.), 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (holding that there is a 
disparate impact cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, but concluding 
that it is narrower than a disparate impact cause of action under Title VII because it is limited by the 
“reasonable factor other than age” clause of the ADEA and because the 1991 Civil Rights Act does 
not apply to the ADEA). First, I would encourage casinos to avoid disparate treatment causes of 
action under the ADEA by not automatically excluding older cocktail servers because of their age. 
Second, to the extent that the casino’s definition of sexy follows social norms, the sexy requirement 
may have an adverse impact on older workers. I recommend that casinos hire older workers who are 
attractive and fit to serve as cocktail servers. These requirements may well be considered reasonable 
by the courts, and therefore, justifications for a disparate impact. By the same token, the casinos 
should realize that social norms do not reflect the broad spectrum of sexual desire and that older 
workers may be considered sexy by some or many customers. Finally, the inclusion of older workers 
in sexy costumes would, like the inclusion of men, challenge the notion that only young women are 
appropriate objects of desire. 
 136. It is unclear how these standards should treat a makeup requirement for women and a 
prohibition for men. So long as the men are required to wear a uniform that is equally subjugating, 
such a differential may pass muster. For a fascinating history of the social meaning of makeup, see 
Devon Carbado, Muti Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at 
Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES (Joel Wm. Friedman, ed., 2006). 
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casino, the BFOQ defense should not protect the casino employer who hires 
women exclusively as cocktail servers. 
One solution to the problem of subordination is to require businesses 
wishing to exploit female sexuality also to exploit male sexuality. While the 
cocktail servers, both men and women, could be required to wear sexually 
suggestive clothing, the presence of men in these jobs would challenge the idea 
of women as sexually submissive servers. This approach would help overcome 
the identification of women as sexual objects. In fact, men would also be 
objectified, but their objectification would make customers more aware of the 
objectification of women. Furthermore, this solution permits women cocktail 
servers to continue to work in casino cocktail server jobs while simultaneously 
breaking down job segregation and opening up other jobs that have previously 
been unavailable to women. Permitting men to serve cocktails creates 
opportunities for men to participate in good jobs that are currently held 
exclusively by women. Finally, this proposal does not unduly encroach upon the 
employer’s prerogatives. It presents a choice to employers of either using a 
unisex image for its cocktail servers or of hiring both men and women and 
dressing them in equally sexy attire. 
